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NATURE OF THE CASE 
This is an action to recover money for purchases made 
with credit cards issued by Respondent to Appellants. 
Appellants contend that their liability for the purchases is 
limited to $50.00 under 15 u.s.c. § 1643. Respondent contends 
that Appellants' liability is governed by contract. The two 
cases involve identical contracts and nearly identical facts. 
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT 
The court granted Respondent summary judgment against 
each Appellant. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Respondent seeks affirrnance of the District Court's 
judgments. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
A. Appellant Harlan 
In July, 1979, Appellant Harlan, who was prior to that 
time a VISA cardholder at Respondent bank, requested that John 
Harlan be added to the account as an authorized user. (Harlan 
R. 32-33, 35) Respondent honored this request and issued Mr. 
Harlan a VISA card. (Harlan R. 32, 35) At some point between 
July and the end of 1979, Appellant Harlan informed the bank 
that she either wanted the account closed, or wanted the bank 
to deny further extensions of credit to her husband. {Harlan 
R. 28-37) These requests included two letters with identical 
-2-
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I 
wording but different dates, both signed by Appellant Harlan. 
(Harlan R. 36, 37) The date of one of those letters, October 
11, 1979, is clearly inconsistent with Appellant Harlan's sworn 
affidavit, in which she states that she and her husband 
separated in November, 1979. (Harlan R. 36, 28) 
The letters from Appellant Harlan also claimed that 
she no longer had possession of her VISA card, that •(m)y VISA 
was destroyed in the AM-PM teller (•machine• in the second 
letter) at the bank." {Harlan R. 36, 37) Yet Appellant Harlan 
returned the VISA card to the bank three months after the 
latter of the two letters, in March 1980. (Harlan R. 34) When 
Appellant Harlan ref used to pay any amounts owing on the VISA 
account, respondent instituted suit. (Harlan R. 7) 
B. Appellant Jones 
Respondent established VISA and Master Charge accounts 
for Appellant Jones at Appellant's request in 1977. (Jones R. 
39, 40) On or about November 11, 1977 Appellant Jones wrote 
two letters to Respondent, indicating that she would no longer 
honor charges on the two accounts made by her husband, Richard 
Jones. (Jones R. 75) Respondent revoked both accounts and 
made numerous attempts by letter and otherwise to retrieve the 
cards from Mr. and Mrs. Jones. (Jones R. 59-61, 75-76) 
Despite the numerous notices of revocation and requests for 
surrender of her card, Appellant Jones continued to make 
-3-
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charges against the accounts and ref used to return her card 
until March 8, 1978, when an employee of Respondent visited 
Appellant Jones' work place, and retrieved her card. (Jones R. 
72-73, 75-76) Appellant Jones refused to pay the outstanding 
balances on the accounts, and Respondent instituted suit on 
December 12, 1978. (Jones R. 2-10) 
ARGUMENT 
I. LIABILITY FOR APPELLANTS' HUSBANDS' USE OF THE 
CARDS IS NOT GOVERNED BY 15 U.S.C. § 1643, THE 
"UNAUTHORIZED USE STATUE" 
A. Appellants' husbands are not "unauthorized users• 
within the Congressional intent. 
The fifty dollar limitation of liability for 
unauthorized use of a credit card, set out at 15 u.s.c. § 1643, 
and relied upon by Appellants, was not intended to limit 
liability in the present fact situation. During the 1960s, the 
growth of the credit card industry led to the growth of credit 
card fraud. Murray, •A Legal-Empirical Study of the 
Unauthorized Use of Credit Cards", 21 University of Miami Law 
Review 811 (1967). The danger that a lost or stolen credit 
card could be used fraudulently worried lenders as well as 
consumers, since the fear of unlimited liability undoubtedly 
deterred some potential cardholders from obtaining cards. Id. 
811, 813. 
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To deal with the problem, Senator Proxmire introduced 
legislation to limit liability for lost or stolen cards to 
fifty dollars. 115 Cong. Rec. 1947 et. seq. (1969) 
(hereinafter "CRl"). 
The legislation was proposed in the context of the 
unlimited distribution of unsolicited credit cards. CRl, p. 
1947. In that context, Senator Proxmire sought to set ground 
rules for issuing unsolicited cards and protect consumers if 
the unsolicited cards went astray. CRl, p. 1947. The threat 
of liability for cards lost in transit is a constant theme 
throughout the remarks accompanying the introduction of his 
bi 11 , S • 7 21 . CR 1 , pp • 19 4 7 , 19 4 9 , 19 5 2 • 
The bill was passed by the Senate with certain 
perfecting amendments on April 15, 1970. 116 Cong. Rec. 11844 
(1970), (hereinafter •cR2n). Again, the statements on the 
floor repeatedly emphasized that the purpose of the act was to 
prevent liability for lost or stolen cards. CR2, pp. 11829, 
11831, 11840, 11841, 11842, 11843. Senator Proxmire, the 
bill's author, said •ct)he second amendment contains a valuable 
new requirement that the issuer provide the consumer with a 
stamped, self-addressed notification form which the consumer 
can use to notify the company of the card's loss or theft." 
CR2 at 11842 (emphasis added). Senator Percy, in presenting 
the minority's view, described the effect of the liability 
-5-
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limit as follows: "Once the cardholder notifies the issuer 
that his card has been lost or stolen, he retains no liability 
for misuse which may occur after that notification.• CR2 at 
11841 (emphasis added). With regard to imposing criminal 
liability of a $1,000 fine or 1 year imprisonment for 
unauthorized use, Senator Long said, "I hope that would be 
adequate, but it is certainly better than nothing with regard 
to people who have been stealing credit cards and using them in 
a way that amounts to theft.• CR2 at 11839 (emphasis added). 
In discussing his amendment to bar the distribution of 
unsolicited cards, Senator Mcintyre, a cosponsor, said "(t)he 
mailing of unsolicited credit cards invites theft and 
fraud. • • • Such cards bear a computer account number and 
lack only a signature to validate them. Therefore, any card 
which is misdirected or stolen from the mail may be used by 
anyone gaining access to it.• CR2 at 11831 (emphasis added). 
The debate touched on the use of cards by family 
members twice. First, Senator Proxmire noted "(e)limination of 
the unsolicited credit card reduces the likelihood that a 
family member will get a card without the knowledge of the head 
of the household." CR2 at 11829. Finally, in perhaps the most 
telling commentary of all, Senators Long and Mcintyre carried 
on the following discussion of the effect of Senator Long's 
amendment adding criminal liability for unauthorized use: 
-6-
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Mr. McINTYRE. What happens if the husband 
and wife were having marital difficulties 
and the wife used her husband's credit card 
and he asserted that it was an unauthorized 
use of the card? Would the wife take the 
risk of going to jail? 
Mr. LONG. I seriously considered that with 
respect to all relatives--and in conference 
this matter could be considered--we would 
not involve ourselves; that we would exclude 
from the provisions of the act unauthorized 
action by a spouse or anyone who was a 
direct descendant or ascendant or immediate 
member of a family. 
We have the situation every day where a 
wife is supposed to exceed authorized 
spending. Those clashes, which occur from 
time to time, are looked on in the law as 
more of family disputes than crimes. Many 
times, when a husband is in a quarrel with 
his wife, from whom he is estranged, he is 
accused of kidnaping children. There often 
are cases in which a husband accuses a wife 
of taking something she is not supposed to 
have, or vice versa. 
CR2 at 11840 (emphasis added). 
The Senate Report was even more explicit: 
The purpose of the legislation is to 
safeguard the consumer by prohibiting the 
issuance of unsolicated credit cards and by 
limiting the consumer's liability for a lost 
or stolen card to not more than $50. Senate 
Comm. on Banking and Currency, Unsolicited 
Credit Cards s. Rep. No. 91-739, 9lst Cong., 
2nd Sess. 1 (1970) (emphasis added). 
With few changes, the Proxmire proposal was ultimately enacted 
into law as Title V of Public Law 91-508 on October 26, 1970. 
That law is now codified at 15 u.s.c. sections 1642-44. 
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The context of the legislation is clear. It was 
enacted to deal with a perceived problem of unlimited 
cardholder liability where cards are lost or stolen, that is, 
where use was never authorized in the first place. Congress 
never intended the law to apply to the present situation, where 
use once authorized is revoked. 
B. Appellants' Husbands' use was not •unauthorized• 
within the meaning of 15 u.s.c. § 1643. 
The term •unauthorized use" is defined in 15 u.s.c. 
§ 1602 (o) (1974) as: 
use of a credit card by a person other than 
the cardholder who does not have actual, 
implied, or apparent authority for such use 
and from which the cardholder receives no 
benefit. 
A lost or stolen card fits this definition. When a 
thief presents the card for use, his signature will not match 
the signature on the card's signature line, and his name will 
not match the name imprinted on the card. Without question the 
thief has no implied or apparent authority to use the card. 
Appellants' husbands, on the other hand, clearly had 
apparent authority to use the cards where their signatures were 
the same as the signatures on the cards, and where their names 
were the names imprinted upon the cards. See e.g., Martin v. 
American Express, Inc., 361 So. 2d 597 (Ala. Civ. App. 1978). 
-8-
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The language of the statute is clear and unambiguous. 
The •apparent authorityw of the Appellants' husbands when they 
used the cards excludes them from the definition of 
unauthorized use, and consequently from the limitation of 
liability of 15 U.S.C. § 1643. 
Any other interpretation of the statute would create 
absurd and grossly inequitable results. The potential for 
fraud would be enormous. The Alabama court, when confronted by 
this issue, aptly described one such potential for fraud: 
Were we to adopt any other view, we would 
provide the unscrupulous and dishonest card 
holder with the means to defraud the card 
issuer by allowing his or her friends to use 
the card, run up hundreds of dollars in 
charges and then limit his or her liability 
to $50.00 by notifying the card issuer. 
Martin v. American Express, supra, at 601. 
Another opportunity for such fraud is demonstrated by 
the very facts of Appellant Jones' case. Betty Jones herself 
continued to make charges against the account after notifying 
Respondent of her husbands alleged •unauthorized use"; and when 
Respondent sought to retrieve her cards, she claimed that they 
had been destroyed. Appellant Jones then sought to avoid all 
liability for charges made after the notification on the ground 
that they were Richards' "unauthorized" charges. Only by 
retrieving f rorn the clearing house numerous transaction slips 
and manually sorting though them, all at considerable expense, 
-9-
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was Respondent ultimately able to determine that not only 
Richard Jones, but Appellant Jones herself was continuing to 
make charges against the account, (Jones R. 75, 79, 85-90). 
How many charges Appellant Jones made is unknown. The 
critical fact is that she tried to avoid liability for the 
charges she did make by invoking the unauthorized use statute, 
thereby demonstrating the incredible potential for fraud which 
would be created if Appellants' proposed construction of 15 
u.s.c. § 1643 were adopted by this court. 
Furthermore, even if Appellants' construction of the 
statute were correct, the FTC has provided an exception to the 
statute when the •cardholder has engaged in fraudulent use of 
its credit card.• See, In the Matter of Shell Oil Company, 95 
F.T.C. 357 (1980). Certainly the issue of fraud is not too far 
below the surf ace when the file in the Harlan case shows two 
essentially identical letters with different dates and both 
files show that the Appellants continued to make use of their 
cards while telling the bank that they had no cards, or that 
the cards were destroyed, or that all the charges were being 
made by their husbands. (Harlan R. 33-34, 36-37 Jones R. 75, 
79) • 
C. Appellant's notification to Respondent did not 
trigger the operation of the unauthorized use 
statute. 
Appellants would have this court accept the 
proposition that it is notification to the card issuer which 
-10-
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renders use •unauthorized" use within the meaning of the 
statute; ergo, the point at which Appellants notified 
Respondent terminated their liability. Appellants have 
demonstrated their misunderstanding of the statute by use of 
the following paraphrase of it: 
•[N]otice to Respondent bank ended the 
authorized use of Appellants' credit cards 
by their husband, their liability for 
charges after the notice is limited to 
$50.00 by federal law and regulations.• 
Appellant's Brief at p. 13-14. 
The statute actually reads: 
"(a) A cardholder shall be liable for the 
unauthorized use of a credit card only 
if .•• the liability is not in excess of 
$50.00 ••• and the unauthorized use occurs 
before the cardholder has notified the 
issuer .•. 
(d) Except as provided in this section, a 
cardholder incurs no liability from the 
unauthorized use of a credit card." 
15 u.s.c. § 1643 (emphasis added). 
The statutory language and congressional intent are 
exceedingly clear: it is the wrongful use of a card by one who 
never had authority to use it which renders the use 
•unauthorized• within the meaning of the statute. The 
notification to the card issuer has no bearing on whether the 
use is •unauthorized• so as to entitle a cardholder to the 
-11-
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statutory limitation of liability. The use is either 
unauthorized or it isn't regardless of notification. Under the 
statute a cardholder is liable for only $50.00 in unauthorized 
charges regardless of whether or not the issuer was ever 
notified; the notification serves only one purpose -- it 
/ 
eliminates the $50.00 liability if it is received before the 
unauthorized charges are incurred. 
Thus, Appellants' contention that their notification 
in and of itself rendered the use unauthorized is totally 
without merit. Their notification is totally irrelevant unless 
Appellants can first demonstrate that their husbands' use, with 
or without notification, was •unauthorized 8 • 
When viewed in the context of congressional intent, 
discussed supra, the statute cannot be read any other way. The 
statute was intended to cover use by a thief or other wrongdoer 
who never had actual, implied, or apparent authority to begin 
with. Congress never intended the statute to apply to 
de-authorized use by a spouse. The only reasonable analysis to 
apply to Appellants' attempt to de-authorize their husband's 
use and terminate their liability is whether their actions were 
sufficient under the contract. 
-12-
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II. LIABILITY FOR APPELLANTS' HUSBANDS' 
USE OF THE CARDS IS GOVERNED BY THEIR 
CONTRACTS WITH RESPONDENT 
Respondent, like other card issuers, willingly assumes 
certain risks when it issues cards to applicants; one of those 
risks is that the card will accidently fall into the hands of a 
wrongdoer by loss or theft. In such a case the cardholder has 
little more opportunity than does the issuer to prevent the 
wrongdoing. Consequently, the Congressional decision to place 
such a risk on the issuer by enacting 15 u.s.c. § 1643 is 
ultimately fair and equitable and is a conscious risk taken by 
card issuers. 
Quite the opposite, however, is the situation 
presented by Appellants. Appellants themselves created the 
opportunity for their husbands to use the cards and they 
consciously and contractually assumed the risk. In reliance on 
the contractual promises and the credit rating of the 
Appellants, Respondent allowed their spouses to have cards with 
their names imprinted thereon; and merchants in reliance upon 
the apparent authority demonstrated by the cards allowed the 
spouses to make charges. Now Appellants would seek to shift 
the risk and avoid their contracts by invoking the 
•unauthorized use• statute. Appellants' argument· is totally 
without merit. 
-13-
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Appellants had available to them a perfectly adequate 
means of terminating their liability, a method provided for in 
the terms of Appellants' contracts with Respondents -- simply 
returning the cards to Respondent. Yet Appellants, knowing 
full well the requirements for terminating their liability, 
refused and failed to take the steps necessary to do so. 
Rather they preferred to keep their cards and make additional 
charges and then avoid liability by claiming wunauthorized 
use.w Appellants received the benefit of their bargain with 
Respondent and should not be allowed to deprive Respondent of 
its benefit by a distorted interpretation of the statute. 
Instead, Appellants' liability and the termination of that 
liability should be governed solely by the contract upon which 
Respondent relied in issuing the cards to the husbands. 
III. RESPONDENT HAD NO OBLIGATION TO SUE 
APPELLANTS' HUSBANDS 
Appellants would have the court inf er some 
significance to Respondent's choice of defendants below, i.e., 
the suits were brought only against the wives, and not their 
husbands. (Appellants' Brief Page 6) Appellants failed to 
cite any authority for this unusual proposition with regard to 
neccesary parties or indispensability, and Respondent rejects 
it. Further, Respondent directs the court's attention to the 
interpretation of the Federal Reserve Board, which declared 
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•that no primary contractual liability on the credit card 
account is imposed upon the other spouse (spouse B) merely by 
issuing a card at the request of the spouse A." FRB Official 
Staff Interpretation Number FC-0070, 42 Fed. Reg. 25,491 
(1980). Thus Respondent's choice of defendants at the District 
Court level was simply in keeping with the Truth-in-Lending 
Act, and has no further or independent significance. 
IV. THE CASES CITED BY APPELLANTS 
SUPPORT RESPONDENT'S, NOT APPELLANTS', POSITION. 
Appellants' citation of an Ohio case for the 
proposition that a cardholder is not liable for charges by an 
authorized user after notification is utterly wrong. Rather, 
the Ohio Court of Appeals held that an authorized user 
("recipient of related card") is not liable for cash advances 
made to the cardholder. Cleveland Trust Co. v. Snyder, 55 Ohio 
App. 2d 168, 9 Ohio Ops. 3d 329, 380 N.E. 2d 354, 360 (1978). 
Furthermore, the Ohio court, in dicta, stated: 
That the cardholder is liable for the 
charges to his account, made by himself and 
by a holder of a related card, is clear. 
Cleveland Trust Co. v. Snyder, 380 N.E. 2d at 360. 
Respondent urges this Court to follow the careful 
analysis used by the Ohio court in reaching the decision they 
actually made. 
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The New York case cited by Appellants also supports 
Respondents' position that it is the contract which governs 
Appellants' liability, not 15 u.s.c. § 1643. The New York 
court held that the cardholder did revoke the account and 
terminate his liability for his wife's use where he gave the 
card issuer notice and surrendered his card. Socony Mobil Oil 
Co. v. Greif, 10 A.D. 2d 119, 197 N.Y.S. 2d 522 (1960). The 
court went on to suggest that had the credit card contract 
explicitly required the surrender of both cards, it would 
enforce it. •plaintiff's contention as to the necessity of the 
surrender of both cards has no support in any of the contract 
provisions and there seems to us no sufficient basis for 
inferring such a condition.• Socony Mobil Oil Co., v. Greif, 
197 N.Y.S. 2d at 523. This case obviously supports 
Respondent's position that the terms of the contract, not 15 
u.s.c. § 1643, govern the termination of a cardholder's 
liability for charges made by one whom that cardholder 
previously authorized to use the card. 
CONCLUSION 
The limit on liability for unauthorized use of credit 
cards of 15 u.s.c. § 1643 was not intended by Congress to apply 
to Appellants' situation. Even if it were applicable, 
Appellants do not come within the meaning of the statute 
because their husbands had •apparent authority• when they used 
-16-
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the cards. For these reasons, this court should hold that the 
unauthorized use statute does not apply where the use has 
previously been authorized and the user did not obtain the 
cards by wrongful means, and that it is the contract between 
the cardholder and card issuer which governs the liability in 
( 
such a situation. The summary Judgments of the Third Judicial 
District Court should be affirmed1A 
DATED this ~Vcl day of rt~ J 
,/ 
' 1982. 
JONES, WALDO, HOLBROOK & McDONOUGH 
Attorneys for Respondent 
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